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A STATUTORY PROPOSAL COMPENSATING
ATTORNEYS APPOINTED TO REPRESENT
INDIGENT CIVIL DEFENDANTS

I.

INTRODUCTION

Perhaps the highest ideal to which the American judicial system
can aspire is that justice must be blind to race, sex, religion, and
wealth. Although this goal is not always attainable, the judicial system should always strive to reach it. Of the possible prejudicial characteristics, wealth, or the lack of wealth, is the most difficult for the
legal system to neutralize as a factor in civil litigation. Not only can
a shortage of funds reduce the quality of representation available, it
affects the quality and extent of discovery, the ability to investigate
the facts of a case thoroughly, the capacity to pursue an adverse
judgment on appeal, and the initial decision to file or defend a case.
Recognizing that money has such a profound effect upon lawsuits,
California courts are aggressive in attempting to reduce any discrepancy in meting out justice in civil causes of action between the poor
and the wealthy.
One way to neutralize differences in wealth between civil litigants is to provide an attorney to a person who cannot afford to hire
one. California does not allow an indigent litigant to retain counsel
at the expense of either the state or the lawyer in all civil cases,1 but
the indigent defendant has the constitutional and/or statutory right
to retain a court-appointed attorney in some civil litigation.' A courtappointed attorney representing an indigent defendant in a civil suit
must work gratuitously and may be inexperienced in handling the
legal issues involved in the case. Due to the inadequacies in the
court-appointed counsel system, conscripted counsel must shoulder a
heavy financial burden and defendants may not receive committed
and competent representation.
The problems with court-appointed attorneys representing indigent civil defendants are discussed in Cunningham v. Superior
© 1988 by Charles S. Redfield
1. Hunt v. Hackett, 36 Cal. App. 3d 134, 111 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1973). See infra note 26
and accompanying text.
2. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
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Court,' a 1986 California decision. The appellant in Cunningham
was an appointed attorney who was forced to represent an indigent
civil defendant in a state prosecuted paternity case. The Second District Court of Appeals held that appointment of counsel without
compensation violates the equal protection clause because the government "seeks to charge the cost of operation of a state function, conducted for the benefit of the public, to a particular class of persons.''
Although the Cunningham court's decision does not bind any district," the decision's logic, coupled with the California Supreme
Court's refusal to hear the case, is potentially persuasive to other
California courts.
If the Cunningham holding is adopted by other districts in California, California trial courts will be faced with a twofold dilemma.
First, an indigent civil defendant who has the constitutional or statutory right to be represented by counsel must have an attorney, but
the court will lack authority to appoint an involuntary, pro bono
attorney. If the trial court cannot appropriate funds to pay an appointed attorney6 and if no volunteer or legal aid society steps forward to represent the indigent, the trial court will be required to
dismiss the case against the indigent defendant.
This comment examines the dilemma created by the Cunningham decision.7 Section II gives the judicial history of the compensation and representation issues. Section III analyzes the constitutionality of appointing attorneys to indigent civil litigants and the
unconstitutionality of failing to compensate attorneys who are appointed to represent indigent civil defendants. Finally, Section IV
proposes statutory reform to provide compensation for fees and reimbursement for costs to attorneys who are appointed to represent indigent defendants in certain civil cases.

3. 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986).
4. Id. at 348, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
5. Auto Equity Sales v. Superior Court, 57 Cal. 2d 450, 455, 369 P.2d 937, 944, 20
Cal. Rptr. 321, 324 (1962).
6. Payne v. Superior Court, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 924, 553 P.2d 565, 576, 132 Cal. Rptr.
405, 416 (1976).
7.

177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 356, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854, 867 (1986).
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II. BACKGROUND

A. Early California Cases That Denied Compensation to Appointed Attorneys
The issue of whether attorneys must represent indigent defendants without compensation is not a recent one. In 1860, the California Supreme Court decided in Rowe v. Yuba County8 that absent a
statute, attorneys must represent indigent defendants in criminal
cases without compensation. In an often quoted passage from the
decision, the Rowe court said:
[It is part of the general duty of counsel to render their professional services to persons accused of crime, who are destitute of
means, upon the appointment of the Court, when not inconsistent with their obligations to others; and for compensation, they
must trust to the possible future ability of the parties. Counsel
are not considered at liberty to reject, under circumstances of
this character, the cause of the defenseless, because no provision
for their compensation is made by law.'
The same principle was continued in Lamont v. Solano County. In
this criminal case, an appointed attorney spent a considerable
amount of his own funds in investigating a possible defense for the
accused. He filed suit against the county where the criminal case was
tried for reimbursement of his expenses. The California Supreme
Court rejected the attorney's claim and held that he had to give his
services to the accused without any reimbursement."1
There were no California cases holding that an attorney could
not be forced to represent an indigent without compensation until
Cunningham.12 Accordingly, the state Legislature's lack of action in
providing money for court-appointed attorneys' costs and fees meant
that conscripted attorneys were required to work for free. Even
though court-appointed attorneys cannot be paid for their services,
the judiciary and Legislature have expanded indigents' right to counsel in California.
8.

17 Cal. 61 (1860).
9. Id. at 63.
10. 49 Cal. 158 (1874).
11. Id. at 159.
12. 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986).

SANTA CLARA LAW REVIEW
B.

[Vol. 28

Federal Expansion of Indigents' Right to Appointed Counsel

California courts became receptive to the appointment of counsel for indigents in civil litigation because the United States Supreme
Court expanded indigents' right to counsel and access to the courts.
4
3 and In re Gault,1
the United States
In Gideon v. Wainwright"
Supreme Court established precedent that formed the basis of subsequent California decisions"5 establishing indigents' right to counsel
in certain civil causes of action. In Gideon, the Court recognized that
an unrepresented criminal defendant in the American judicial system
is not guaranteed a fair trial. 6 The Gault decision extended Gideon
to a juvenile delinquency hearing because of its criminal nature and
because the proceedings were "comparable in seriousness to a felony
prosecution."" The appointment of attorneys in Gideon and Gault
was seen as essential to an indigent's fair defense. This rationale was
soon extended to an indigent's financial inability to gain access to the
court.
Unable to afford litigation costs, indigents lacked a meaningful
8
opportunity to be heard in courts. In Boddie v. Connecticut, the
United States Supreme Court ruled that indigents could not be
forced to pay filing fees in order to dissolve their marriages. The
Boddie Court recognized that the indigents' lack of access to the
9
court in this civil case effectively denied them their rights; a state's
2 demands
monopoly over "techniques of final dispute settlement"
that the state find ways to maintain an equal right of access to the
proceedings. Although subsequent Supreme Court decisions limited
the Boddie decision, 2 they did not overrule the principle that indi13. 372 U.S. 335 (1963). The Court held that any person charged with a felony has a
sixth amendment right to an appointed counsel.
14. 387 U.S. 1 (1967). Basing its decision on the defendant's due process rights, the
Court appointed counsel to an indigent in a juvenile delinquency proceeding in which institutional commitment was a possibility.
15. Salas v. Cortez, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979); Payne, 17
Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976); In re Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d 510,
110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973).
16. 372 U.S. at 344.
17. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 11, 36 (1967).
18. 401 U.S. 371 (1971).
19. Id. at 380-81.
20. Id. at 375. The Court perceived a divorce proceeding as being a technique of final
dispute settlement.
21. Ortwein v. Schwab, 410 U.S. 656 (1972) (the Court upheld the validity of a twentyfive dollar filing fee required for appellate review of an agency determination that resulted in
lower welfare payments for a poor person); United States v. Kras, 409 U.S. 434 (1971) (an
indigent debtor was required to pay a fifty dollar filing fee in order to obtain a discharge in
bankruptcy).
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gents have rights of equal access to the courts in certain civil litigatory situations.
C. California's Treatment of Indigents' Right to Counsel Before
22
Payne v. Superior Court
The California courts did not initially participate in the expansion of indigents' rights in civil litigation. In In re Robinson,23 the
Second District Court of Appeals found no statutory or constitutional right to appointed counsel for either parents or children in
dependency status proceedings. The court ruled that there was no
legislative authorization for court-appointed counsel in proceedings
under sections 634, 679, 700 and 729 of the California Welfare and
Institutions Code and section 27706(e) of the Government Code.24
The Robinson court viewed the statutes as restricting court-appointed attorneys to delinquency proceedings and differentiated "a
proceeding to adjudicate the dependency status of a child as a true
civil cause, comparable in essentials to a child custody controversy
between parents, except that the controversy is not between parents
but one between a parent (or parents) and the state as parens
25
patrie."
Further demonstrating the California judiciary's initial reluctance to appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants, in Hunt
v. Hacket, 6 the Second District Court of Appeals refused to appoint
counsel to an indigent defendant in a civil cause of action involving
the sale of real estate. The Hunt court, while distinguishing Ferguson v. Keays,2' ruled that there is no California common law or constitutional right to the appointment of counsel for indigents in civil
cases. The court reasoned that the indigents' right of access to the
courts "has not been extended to include any right to court-ap22. 17 Cal. 3d 908,'553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
23. 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970).
24. Welfare and Institutions Code sections 634, 679, 700 and 729 discuss the procedures
for appointing counsel to juvenile delinquents who are described in Welfare and Institutions
Code sections 601 and 602. Section 27706(e) of the Government Code sets forth the proceedings in which public defenders can be appointed to represent indigents. In re Robinson, 8 Cal.
App. 3d 783, 785-86, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678, 679-80 (1970).
25. Robinson, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 786, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 680 (italics omitted).
26. 36 Cal. App. 3d 134, 111 Cal. Rptr. 456 (1973).
27. 4 Cal. 3d 649, 484 P.2d 70, 94 Cal. Rptr. 398 (1971). In Ferguson v. Keays, the
California Supreme Court held that an indigent with a meritorious appeal did not have to pay
an appellate filing fee. 4 Cal. 3d at 652, 484 P.2d at 71, 94 Cal. Rptr. at 399. The Hunt v.
Hacket, court said that the Ferguson ruling was limited to its facts and could not be extended
to any right to court-appointed counsel. 36 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
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pointed counsel." 8 The Hunt decision has not been overruled and is
the current rule regarding the inability of courts to appoint counsel
to all indigent civil litigants.
Although Hunt stands for the broad proposition that all indigent civil defendants cannot have appointed attorneys, an indigent
defendant's right to counsel has been expanded to some civil situations. In In re Rodriguez,"' which was decided two months before
Hunt, an appellate court held that an imprisoned father defending
against a state initiated suit to remove his children from his custody
was entitled to court-appointed counsel based on statutory and due
process rights. After determining that California Civil Code section
237.580 mandated appointment of an attorney in a Civil Code section
232(d)"1 custody case, the Rodriguez court relied on Gideon 2 to decide that due process requires appointment of counsel for an accused
when the state seeks to deprive parents of all further parental relationships with their children. This constitutional grounding, coupled
28. Hunt, 36 Cal. App. 3d at 137, 111 Cal. Rptr. at 458.
29. 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973).
30. At the beginning of the proceeding on a petition filed pursuant to this chapter, the judge shall first read the petition to the child's parents, if they are present, and may explain to the child the effect of the granting of the petition and
upon request of the minor upon whose behalf the petition has been brought or
upon the request of either parent the judge shall explain any term or allegation
contained therein and the nature of the proceeding, its procedures, and possible
consequences. The judge shall ascertain whether the minor and his parent, have
been informed of the right of the minor to be represented by counsel, and if not,
the judge shall advise the minor and the parents, if present, of the right to have
counsel present.
The court may appoint counsel to represent the minor whether or not the
minor is able to afford counsel, and if they are unable to afford counsel, shall
appoint counsel to represent the parents. The court may continue the proceeding for not to exceed seven days, as necessary to make an appointment of counsel, or to enable counsel to acquaint himself with the case, or to determine
whether the parents are unable to afford counsel at their own expense.
When the court appoints counsel to represent either the minor or the parents under the provisions of this section, such counsel shall receive a reasonable
sum for compensation and expenses, the amount of which shall be determined
by the court. Such amount shall be paid by the real parties in interest, other
than the minor, in such proportions as the court deems just. However, if the
court finds that none of such real parties in interest is able to afford counsel,
such amount shall be paid out of the general fund of the county.
Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 513 n.2, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 58 n.2 (1973) (citing CAL. Civ.
CODE

§ 237.5).

31. Civil Code section 232(d) gives the procedures for declaring a minor free from the
custody or control of the parent. If the parents have been convicted of a felony, the child could
be declared free from the custody of the parents. Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 511-12 n.1,
110 Cal. Rptr. at 56-57 n.l.
32. Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963). See supra note 13.
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with statutory authorization provides the basis for all subsequent
cases 8 authorizing appointment of counsel in civil litigation.
Without mentioning any of the due process considerations discussed in Rodriguez, three cases used statutory language to authorize
the appointment of counsel in appellate court proceedings. These actions were brought by the state in order to remove the children from
the custody of their parents and to make these children dependent
upon the state. In a decision, In re Simeth,"4 that partially reversed
Robinson,"6 the Second District Court of Appeals held that parents
are entitled to counsel when their children are removed from them in
a custody proceeding or are found to be dependent pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 600(a). 6 This change resulted
from statutory alteration made by the Legislature since Robinson."7
One year after Simeth, the same appellate court in In re Norma
8
M. held that an indigent appealing a custody and dependency ruling pursuant to Civil Code section 2323' was authorized by the statute to petition for counsel. The court based its decision on two factors. Recognizing the similarities between Welfare and Institutions
Code section 600 proceedings' and Civil Code section 232 proceedings,4" the court perceived the inconsistency of giving indigents free
33. See infra text accompanying notes 34-57 and 59-62.
34. 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974).
35. 8 Cal. App. 3d 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. 678 (1970).
36. Section 600(a) proceedings are brought by the state to declare the child a dependent
of the juvenile court because the child has need of proper and effective parental care or control
and has no parent or guardian willing to exercise, capable of exercising, or actually exercising
such care or control. In re Simeth, 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974).
37. The statute itself was not altered, but similar statutes (Welfare and Institutions
Code sections 634, 679 and 700) were amended to authorize the appointment of counsel in
appellate proceedings. These sections were viewed in conjunction with Government Code section 27 706(e), which authorized the appointment of public defenders to represent defendants
in proceedings pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 600. Because the public
defender is appointed to represent the parent in this juvenile delinquency proceeding, the
Simeth situation is not the type of civil court-appointed counsel that this comment examines.
Simeth, 40 Cal. App. 3d at 984, 115 Cal. Rptr. at 618.
38. 53 Cal. App. 3d 344, 125 Cal. Rptr. 721 (1975).
39. This proceeding is brought by a government agency that believes the parent has
abandoned her children. In re Norma M., 53 Cal. App. 3d 344, 346, 125 Cal. Rptr. 721, 722
(1975).
40. In fact, the court felt in several respects a California Civil Code section 232 appeal
compels an appointment of counsel more than a Welfare and Institutions Code section 600
appeal. Civil Code section 237.5 requires the appointment of trial counsel in a section 232
proceeding, whereas Welfare and Institutions Code section 634 merely authorizes an appointment in a 600 proceeding. Furthermore, a section 232 proceeding could permanently free the
children from the parent's custody, while a 600 proceeding can only result in a parent's loss of
custody on a non-conclusive basis. Norma M., 53 Cal. App.3d at 346, 125 Cal. Rptr. at 72223. For section 232's context see supra note 31.
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transcripts of the trial court proceedings' 1 while disallowing them
free counsel. The California Supreme Court supported the Norma
M. decision in its In re Jacqueline H.42 ruling, in which the court
held that indigent defendants in a Civil Code section 232 proceeding
are entitled to counsel.
D. Payne'4 and the California Expansion of Indigents' Right to
Counsel in Paternity, Child Support and Parental Termination
Proceedings
As evidenced by Simeth," Norma M."5 and Jacqueline H.,"
California courts primarily relied on legislative authorization to decide whether indigents were entitled to court-appointed attorneys.
Rodriguez47 stood alone in utilizing a due process argument to grant
an indigent's right to counsel. None of these cases addressed whether
these appointed attorneys should be compensated for their services.
Payne v. Superior Court 8 was the first California case to authorize appointing counsel to indigent civil defendants solely on constitutional, as opposed to statutory grounds. This decision was also
the only judgment that combined the right to counsel issue with the
court's lack of authority to compensate court-appointed attorneys.
Payne was a prisoner who had a default judgment against him
in a civil case due to his inability to attend the trial. Based on the
due process arguments made in Boddie,49 the court found that Payne
was denied his right of access to the courts and that in certain circumstances the only method of preserving an indigent prisoner's
right of access is appointment of counsel.5" In footnote six of the
opinion, the court stated that until the Legislature "determines that
appointed counsel may be compensated from public funds in civil
cases, attorneys must serve gratuitously in accordance with their statutory duty not to reject 'the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed.' (Bus. and Prof. Code 6068, subd. (h))."' The court then
41.
Superior
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.
49.
50.
51.

Crespo v. Superior Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 115, 115 Cal. Rptr. 681 (1974); Smith v.
Court, 41 Cal. App. 3d 109, 115 Cal. Rptr. 677 (1974).
21 Cal. 3d 170, 577 P.2d 683, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1978).
17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
See supra text accompanying note 34.
See supra text accompanying note 38.
See supra text accompanying note 42.
See supra text accompanying note 29.
17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
401 U.S. 371 (1971).
Payne, 17 Cal. 3d at 924, 553 P.2d at 576, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 416.
Id. at 920 n.6, 553 P.2d at 574 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.6. "It is the duty of an
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set forth the test to determine whether an indigent prisoner can obtain an appointed counsel. 2
The expansion of indigents' right to counsel has continued. The
landmark case in this area is Salas v. Cortez." In Salas, the California Supreme Court decided that indigents are constitutionally entitled to court-appointed counsel in proceedings to determine paternity where the state appears as a party or appears on behalf of a
mother or a child.5 4 Without relying on an explicit statutory authorization, the court held that the appointment of counsel was justified
by 1) the serious reputational, familial and possible criminal ramifications of a paternity adjudication; 2) the complexity of the proceedings; and 3) the importance of the outcome to the state. The court
distinguished paternity proceedings from other civil actions because
in a paternity proceeding, "the full power of the state is pitted
against an indigent in an adjudication of the existence of a fundamental biological relationship entailing serious financial, legal and
moral obligations. ' '5' The state's interest in not appointing attorneys
is largely financial, based on the extra expense of representing defendants. The Salas court found that the increased likelihood of accurate paternity determinations counterbalanced any extra expenses
incurred by the state."
Since Salas, no decisions curtail indigents' right to appointed
counsel in paternity and child support cases. In fact, several cases
refine this right. In Lassiter v. Department of Social Services,58 the
United States Supreme Court, while rejecting the view that due process requires appointment of counsel in every parental status proceeding involving indigent parents, held that under the fourteenth
attorney to do all of the following: . . . (h) Never to reject, for any consideration personal to
himself or herself, the cause of the defenseless or the oppressed." CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §

6068(h) (West 1982).
52. Before a prisoner who is a defendant in a civil suit can be appointed counsel, the
trial court must determine whether the prisoner is indigent. If the prisoner is indigent, then the
court must decide if a continuance is feasible. If a continuance is not feasible, it should then
ascertain whether the prisoner's interests are actually at stake in the suit. Finally, the court
should decide whether an attorney would be helpful to him under the circumstances of the
case. An attorney would not be necessary if the prisoner is not contesting the suit against him.
An attorney would be necessary if the prisoner plans to defend the action and an adverse
judgment would affect his present or future property rights. Payne, 17 Cal. 3d at 924, 553
P.2d at 577, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 417.
53. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
54. Id. at 34, 593 P.2d at 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
55. Id. at 26-34, 593 P.2d at 229-34, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 532-37.
56. Id. at 32, 593 P.2d at 233, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
57. Id. at 33, 593 P.2d at 233, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
58. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
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amendment, indigent parents may be entitled to appointed counsel in
parental termination proceedings. This decision sustained California's treatment of the issue since the Supreme Court left to the states
the issue of whether counsel should be appointed in parental termination proceedings.
With implicit United States Supreme Court support for California's treatment of appointing attorneys for indigents in parental
termination proceedings, two more appellate courts expanded indigents' right to court-appointed counsel even further. Citing Lassiter,
the Third District Court of Appeals in In re Jay R.59 held that an
indigent non-custodial parent has a due process right to court-appointed counsel in a parental termination and adoption proceeding
brought by the stepparent without the consent of the natural parents,
pursuant to Civil Code section 224.60 Similarly, in County of Ventura v. Tillett,61 Division Four of the Second District Court of Appeals held that indigent defendants in child support actions prosecuted by the district attorney under Welfare and Institutions Code
section 1135062 are constitutionally entitled to the appointment of
free counsel. With these two decisions, the indigents' right to courtappointed counsel reached its zenith.
E. California's Treatment of the Compensation for Conscripted
Attorneys in Civil Litigation after Payne"'
Subsequent to Payne, California courts continued to expand indigent defendants' right to counsel to civil cases in which the Legislature had not authorized court-appointed representation. However,
the courts did not grant compensation for the attorneys' services to
the indigent defendants. The California Supreme Court refused to
require public funds to be spent for court-appointed attorneys6 4 and
for court-appointed interpreters65 absent some legislative mandate.
Despite the lack of legislative authorization, three trial courts ordered counties to reimburse court-appointed attorneys' costs, but all
three orders were reversed by appellate courts due to a lack of statu59. 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1983).
60. Civil Code section 224 gives the criteria for when a parent could have the power of
consent over the adoption of his or her child taken away. CAL. CIv. CODE § 224 (West 1982).
61. 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 183 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1982).
62. In a section 11350 proceeding, the county attempts to obtain reimbursement for the
money given to the defendant's child by the county for his or her support. CAL. WELF. &
INST. CODE § 11350 (West 1982).

63.
64.
65.

17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
Payne, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
Jara v. Municipal Court, 21 Cal. 3d 181, 578 P.2d 94, 145 Cal. Rptr. 847 (1978).
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tory authorization." Legislative silence regarding compensation for
court-appointed counsel is consistently interpreted by appellate
courts as a legislative refusal to pay conscripted counsel. 7
Recognizing that they could not give direct payments to attorneys, two trial courts tried unique approaches to the problem. In
Littlefield v. Superior Court"' the trial court, pursuant to Government Code section 27706,69 appointed the public defender to represent an indigent defendant in a paternity and child support action
brought by the county. The Second District Court of Appeals construed Government Code section 27706 narrowly and thus reversed
due to a lack of specific authorization. In County of Tulare v.
Ybarra,70 the trial court dismissed a government suit for paternity
and reimbursement for public assistance payments because the father
could not afford counsel and there were no public funds to pay a
court appointed attorney. The Fifth District Court of Appeals reversed the lower court decision because prior case law established
that an indigent's right to a court-appointed counsel requires the
court-appointed attorney to serve gratuitously.
The trial court orders that attempted to either compensate
court-appointed attorneys7 1 or alleviate the burden of representation
of indigent civil defendants7' demonstrate the judiciary's sympathy
with the plight of conscripted counsel. While recognizing the unfairness of the present court-appointment system upon the lawyer who is
forced to represent the indigent civil defendant, appellate courts
could not provide compensation until the supreme court or the Legislature authorized reimbursement for the attorney's services.73
In 1984, the California Supreme Court granted a hearing for
Yarbrough v. Superior Court,4 a decision that California attorneys
hoped would establish the conscripted attorney's right to compensa66. Smith v. Superior Court, 118 Cal. App. 3d 512, 173 Cal. Rptr. 437 (1981); County
of Los Angeles v. Superior Court, 102 Cal. App. 3d 926, 162 Cal. Rptr. 636 (1980); County
of Fresno v. Superior Court, 82 Cal. App. 3d 191, 146 Cal. Rptr. 880 (1978). The court
rejected the argument that the Uniform Parentage Act authorizes payment of these fees and
costs because the relevant section of the act applies only to a cause of action brought by a
parent or a child and not to one brought by a country.
67. See, e.g., Payne, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976); County
of Fresno, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 196, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 882.
68. 98 Cal. App. 3d 652, 160 Cal. Rptr. 175 (1979).
69. See supra notes 24 and 37.
70. 143 Cal. App. 3d 580, 192 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1983).
71. See supra note 66.
72. See supra text accompanying notes 68 and 70.
73. See supra text accompanying notes 6 and 51.
74. 39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
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tion.75 Yarbrough was convicted of second degree murder, and while
in prison, was named as a defendant in a wrongful death suit. The
trial court concluded that appointment of counsel was appropriate,
but Yarbrough's attorney in the criminal trial indicated that he
would decline any gratuitous representation. The county refused to
compensate Yarbrough's attorney, and the trial court refused to appoint a public defender.76
While Yarbrough was pending before the supreme court, the
California Legislature attempted to provide compensation for attorneys appointed to represent indigents in civil cases by passing Senate
Bill 2057. 7 The proposed bill provided $1,000,000 to compensate
attorneys for legal services provided and reimburse costs incurred by
attorneys appointed to represent indigent defendants in civil actions.
The law limited the rate of compensation to a maximum of $60 per
hour. The lawyer could receive compensation when appointed to represent an indigent who had the constitutional right to be represented by counsel. 7 Governor Deukmejian vetoed the bil 7 9 because
Yarbrough 0 was pending before the California Supreme Court and
the bill allowed the court to control the expenditure of funds for
representation of indigents. Also, noting that decisional law confined
the right of appointed counsel to indigents incarcerated in prison,
with this bill the court could expand the term "constitutional right"
to apply to any indigent defendant.8 "
Governor Deukmejian's hope that Yarbrough would answer the
question of whether lawyers can be compelled to represent indigents
without compensation was in vain. The supreme court did not reach
the issue in its decision. Rather, the California Supreme Court issued a writ of mandate directing the trial court to determine whether
access could be provided for Yarbrough by abating the matter until
he was released from prison. Upon reviewing the criteria set forth in
Payne, 2 used to determine whether indigent prisoners are required
an appointed counsel, 8 the supreme court criticized the trial court
for not receiving evidence to permit an assessment of whether or how
75.
76.
77.
78.
79.
1983-84,
80.
81.
82.
83.

Id. at 207, 702 P.2d at 589, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
Id. at 202, 702 P.2d at 586, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 428.
Cal. S.B. 2057, 1983-84 Reg. Sess., 1 (1984).
Id.
LEGISLATURE OF CALIFORNIA, JOURNAL OF THE SENATE,

at 14,346-47 (1984) (hereinafter SENATE JOURNAL).
39 Cal. 3d 197, 702 P.2d 583, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 79, at 14,346.
17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
See supra note 52.

Vol. 8, Regular Session

1988]

COMPENSATING ATTORNEYS

the prisoner's future economic fortunes would be affected by a judgment against him.84 Chief Justice Bird dissented, criticizing the court
for 1 avoiding the issues regarding: (1) whether attorneys appointed
to represent incarcerated, indigent civil defendants are entitled to
compensation; 2) whether the courts possess the power to order such
payment; 3) what will be the source of such compensation.8" The
trial court reheard the case and followed the supreme court's instructions, and counsel was appointed for Yarbrough. The Fifth District
Court of Appeals affirmed the trial court decision, and the California
Supreme Court refused to review the case. 86
After both the Legislature and the supreme court failed to alleviate the compensation problem, a California appellate court decided
to remove the financial burden on conscripted counsel.87 In Cunningham," an appellate court refused to order' an attorney to represent an indigent civil defendant gratuitously. The appellate court
reversed a superior court order compelling Cunningham to perform
pro bono representation for an indigent defendant in a state initiated
paternity proceeding. Cunningham, whose practice was limited to
personal injury matters, had never handled a paternity case. The appointment was made pursuant to a plan designed by the Ventura
County Bar Association and the superior court to allocate free representation among lawyers who have offices in Ventura County." Not
only did the Second District Court of Appeals use the equal protection clause to reverse the superior court order,90 the court referred to
various policy reasons for support of its ruling." The Cunningham
court concluded that compulsory pro bono services discourage attorney participation in voluntary programs and reduce the effectiveness
of counsel."2 Also, the court stated that the Legislature must provide
compensation for conscripted attorneys if the legal profession is to
provide its services to the poor.'" The appellate court ordered the
84. Yarbrough v. Superior Court, 39 Cal. 3d 197, 207, 702 P.2d 583, 589, 216 Cal.
Rptr. 425, 431 (1985).
85. Id. at 207, 702 P.2d at 590, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 432.
86. The trial court decided that it had no legal authority to order any public entity to
pay legal fees or costs in this defense. Yarbrough's counsel must serve without compensation.
The appellate court affirmed in an unpublished opinion. Carrizosa, Yarbrough Case Still
Awaits Trial - By Free Lawyer, 100 L.A. Daily J., Nov. 16, 1987, at 1, col. 6.
87. Cunningham v. Superior Court, 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986).
88. 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986).
89. Id. at 339, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 855.
90. Id. at 347-52, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 861-64.
91. Id. at 352-56, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 864-67.
92. Id.
93. Id. at 356-57, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
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trial court to find qualified counsel, other than Cunningham, to represent the defendant without compensation, otherwise the trial
court could dismiss the paternity proceeding unless the state or
county paid the attorney's fees. 9 '
The Cunningham decision marks a drastic change in the judicial treatment of the issue of whether a court-appointed attorney is
entitled to any compensation. Again, this ruling may only have limited persuasiveness,95 but trial courts in the second district can no
longer conscript unwilling attorneys for indigent defendants in paternity, child support and dependency proceedings unless the county
provides compensation for these attorneys' services. Courts have established the indigent civil defendant's right in certain cases to courtappointed counsel. 9 But if there are no volunteers to represent these
indigents and no legislative appropriation of funds for these courtappointed attorneys, then paternity, reimbursement for public assistance, child support and dependency proceedings could cease to be
prosecuted in the second district.
III.

ANALYSIS

As a result of the Cunningham decision, trial courts are faced
with a conflict. Certain indigent civil defendants have a statutory and
constitutional right to court-appointed attorneys.9" On the other
hand, trial courts violate the constitutional rights of the conscripted
lawyers if they are not compensated for their services. An indigent
defendant's right to counsel in various civil proceedings is authorized
by the Legislature and the constitution," and his or her constitutional right to counsel is the product of a due process analysis. The
argument against appointing attorneys without giving compensation
for their services can be broken down into constitutional and policy
rationales. After reviewing the reasons for and against appointing
attorneys for certain indigent civil defendants as well as the reasons
for and against compensating their appointed counsel, it is apparent
that the California Legislature must appropriate funds to pay these
attorneys.
94. Id. at 357, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 868.
95. See supra note 5.
96. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
97. See infra text accompanying notes 104-08.
98. See, e.g., Robinson, 8 Cal. App. 3d at 783, 87 Cal. Rptr. at 678; Salas, 24 Cal. 3d
22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
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An Indigent Defendant's Right to Counsel

An indigent defendant may retain a court-appointed attorney
only if the court believes he or she has a constitutional or statutory
right to retain counsel. In a federal criminal case where a jail sentence is usually imposed, the sixth amendment requires that the
court appoint counsel if the defendant is financially unable to retain
one." This right is applicable to state criminal trials through the
fourteenth amendment."' 0 The sixth amendment"' does not, however, provide a right to an appointed attorney in civil proceedings.
Courts that appoint attorneys for indigent civil defendants without a
legislative mandate, do so based on the indigent's due process right to
counsel, which is afforded the defendant through either a state's constitution or the United States Constitution. 0 2 California courts that
appoint counsel to indigent civil defendants based their holdings on
the indigent's due process rights, using both the California and the
United States Constitutions."0 8
Presently in California, as developed in the previous section,
there are five scenarios in which courts recognize that an indigent
civil defendant has a right to an appointed attorney: (1) when the
indigent is a prisoner and his or her right of access to the courts
cannot be attained unless counsel is appointed for him or her;'O' (2)
in a paternity suit where the state appears as a party or appears on
behalf of a mother or a child;'0 5 (3) when the state is attempting to
take custody of the indigent's children;' (4) when a stepparent attempts to take custody of the children belonging to an indigent noncustodial parent;10 7 (5) when a county attempts to obtain reimbursement for the money given to the defendant's child by the county for
his or her support.' 0 8 There are several rationales for granting the
indigent defendant counsel in these civil proceedings. Courts provided indigents with attorneys in civil suits based solely on statutory
interpretation 0 9 and based on the defendant's constitutional
99. Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972); Scott v. Illinois, 440 U.S. 367 (1979).
100. Gideon, 372 U.S. 335 (1963).
101. U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
102. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973).
103. Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 34, 593 P.2d at 234, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 537; County of Ventura v. Tillett, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 114, 183 Cal. Rptr. 741, 746-47 (1982).
104. Payne, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
105. Salas, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
106. Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973).
107.

In re Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1983).

108.
109.

County of Ventura, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 183 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1982).
In re Jacqueline H., 21 Cal. 3d 170, 577 P.2d 683, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1978);
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rights."' Other courts assigned counsel to indigents using a combination of statutory and constitutional rights."'
When the California Supreme Court decides whether or not to
appoint counsel for an indigent civil defendant, its due process analysis differs from that propounded by the United States Supreme
Court in Lassiter."2 The biggest difference between California's
treatment of this issue and the United States Supreme Court's treatment of this issue is that the United States Supreme Court presumes
that there is no right to appointed counsel when the defeated indigent defendant will not be deprived of his or her personal freedom." 3 California courts do not analyze the indigent's due process
rights with this presumption.""
Both the California and federal due process tests balance the
interests of the state and of the individual." 5 In Salas,"' the California Supreme Court balanced these concerns and examined the nature of the proceedings in order to develop the factors which distinguish paternity proceedings from other civil proceedings."" In
Lassiter,"8 the United States Supreme Court balanced the identical
interests and evaluated the risk that the procedures used will lead to
erroneous decisions." 9 The Salas court also noted the potential unreliability of a paternity determination when the indigent defendant
does not have representation." 0 The Jay R. court examined "the nature of the proceedings to determine whether counsel is necessary to
obviate the risk of erroneous and unfair results,"'' thus combining
the Salas test with the Lassiter test.
California courts that give indigent defendants in civil cases the
right to court-appointed counsel based upon the indigents' due proSimeth, 40 Cal. App. 3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974).
110. County of Ventura, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 183 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1982); Salas, 24
Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979); Payne, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565,
132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
111. Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1983); Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App.
3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973).
112. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
113. Id. at 26-27.
114. Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 26-27, 593 P.2d at 229-30, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 532-33;Jay R.,
150 Cal. App. 3d at 260-62, 197 Cal. Rptr. at 678-79.
115. Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 27, 593 P.2d at 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533; Lassiter v. Department of Social Services, 452 U.S. 18, 27 (1981).
116. 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
117. Id. at 26-27, 593 P.2d at 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
118. 452 U.S. 18 (1981).
119. Id. at 27.
120. 24 Cal. 3d at 31, 593 P.2d at 232, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 535.
121. 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 262, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672, 679 (1983).
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cess rights provide many reasons to justify the indigents' need for
these attorneys. With the exception of Payne,'22 these cases involve
state participation in parental termination, paternity determination
or the reimbursement of state child support payments proceedings.
In such cases, the state is an adversary to the indigent.' This adversarial relationship is an important factor in the due process discussion, as its existence distinguishes these three types of cases from
other civil litigation, where there usually is no right to a court-appointed attorney.1 24 Courts which found a right to counsel recognized that an unrepresented indigent is not an adversarial match for
the power of the state. 28
Not only does the indigent defendant's unequal position as compared to the state warrant the appointment of counsel, the substantial deprivations that an indigent defendant risks in all of the before
mentioned proceedings further justifies the appointment of counsel
for him or her. In a parental termination case, either one brought by
the state or by a step-parent, the indigent defendant risks losing the
parental relationship to his or her children, which is a "vastly
greater punishment than the levying of a fine or even imprisonment
resulting from a criminal conviction. ' In a paternity proceeding,
the father risks the declaration of the existence of a biological relationship, which has profound ramifications for him. Not only does
122. 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976). Payne's decision primarily relates to an indigent prisoner's right of access to the courts and how the right to courtappointed counsel is needed to preserve the prisoner's right of access to the courts. Since the
court did not rule on the prisoner's right to counsel separately from the prisoner's right of
access, the Payne court's discussion of when the court-appointed attorney should be appointed
does not factor in the state participation in the trial. Thus, the Payne court did not analyze
why an indigent defendant has a due process right to a court-appointed attorney in a civil case
when the state is a participant.
123. In fact, a parent receiving state AFDC aid must assign to the county any rights to
support from any other person and must cooperate in establishing the paternity of a child born
out of wedlock for whom aid is claimed. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §§11475.1, 11476 (West
1982 & Supp. 1987). The district attorney is authorized to bring an action on behalf of either
the mother, the child or the county to determine parentage and enforce support. CAL. WELF.
& INST. CODE § 11350.1 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). Although these services are voluntarily
provided, these suits are mandatory where the custodial parent is receiving welfare payments.
Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 30, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 534, 593 P.2d at 231.
124. Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 32, 593 P.2d at 233, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
125. Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 514, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 59; Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 3031, 593 P.2d at 232-33, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 535; Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d at 263, 197 Cal.
Rptr. at 680. Even though Jay R. involved a stepparent adoption, the parent's lack of consent
to the adoption often involves the state as a party to the suit by its report to the court on
whether it approves of the stepparent's adoption, along with its reasons why itapproves of the
adoption.
126. Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d at 514, 110 Cal. Rptr. at 58.
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this determination present possible negative reputational and familial
implications, a paternity judgment could result in child support obligations. If these payments are not made, the father could face a civil
contempt ruling.1 2 An adverse civil contempt ruling might ultimately lead to imprisonment.1 28 When the state brings a suit to gain
reimbursement for money it provides to support defendant's children,
the defendant risks possible deprivation of property and liberty. This
risk is a private interest which merits the appointment of counsel to
represent the indigent defendant. 29 Even the state has an interest in
appointing counsel for indigent defendants. In a paternity case-an
attorney adds to the reliability of the paternity proceeding.'
In opposition to the reasons supporting appointment of counsel,
the state's interest in refusing to appoint counsel is financial. According to the Lassiter court, the state wishes these proceedings to be
decided "as economically as possible and thus wants to avoid both
the expense of appointed counsel and the cost of the lengthened proceedings his presence may cause. But though the State's pecuniary
interest is legitimate, it is hardly significant enough to overcome private interests as important as those here ... '"3'
A minority of states do not appoint attorneys to represent indigent defendants in paternity, child support and parental termination
proceedings.' 2 The jurisdictions that do not appoint counsel to indigent defendants in paternity and non-support proceedings base their
holdings on insufficient threats to the defendant's liberty or property
and/or on the lack of complexity involved in the suits.' The majority of jurisdictions hold that indigent defendants in a parental termination hearing brought by the state have a due process right to appointed counsel.'"' The states that do appoint attorneys to indigent
127. Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 28, 593 P.2d at 230, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533. Also, a child
support order is more freely enforceable by garnishment than an ordinary civil judgment and
is not dischargeable in bankruptcy.
128. Salas, 24 Cal. 3d at 28-29, 593 P.2d at 230-31, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 533.
129. Id. at 28, 593 P.2d at 230, 154 Cal.Rptr. at 553.
130. Id. at 31, 593 P.2d at 232, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 535. "Unless the rights of indigent
paternity defendants are protected, courts risk finding not the right man, but simply the
poorest man tobe the father of a child." Id.
131. Lassiter,452 U.S. at 28. Salas expressed the same sentiments, including the possibility of indigent defendants being represented atpublic expense. The Salas court did not give
anymore indication of whether these defendants should be represented at public expense. 24
Cal. 3d at 33, 593 P.2d at233, 154 Cal. Rptr. at 536.
132. Annot., 80 A.L.R. 3d 1141 (1977).
133. See, e.g., Jolly v. Wright, 300 N.C. 83, 265 S.E. 2d 135 (1980); State v. Walker,
87 Wash. 2d 443, 553 P.2d 1093 (1976).
134. Annot., 80 A.L.R. 3d 1141 (1977).
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defendants in paternity proceedings base the appointments on a due
process rationale similar to California.18 California's treatment of
the appointment of counsel in certain civil litigation is not only rational and fair, but it has support in the majority of other
jurisdictions.'
The California judiciary has given indigent defendants a right
to counsel in a greater amount of civil litigation. The increase in
cases requiring court-appointed attorneys was accomplished on a
gradual basis. This expansion should not be viewed as an opening of
Pandora's box. The growth was caused by the fact that certain indigent defendants have an unequal access to the courts when pitted
against the powers of the state. Courts that recognize the indigent
defendant's constitutional right to counsel demonstrate a comprehension of the ramifications of insufficient resources upon the outcome of
a trial. California courts' efforts to decrease the disparity in justice
caused by the differences in legal and monetary resources between
the litigants are laudable and should not be circumscribed.
B.

Compensationfor Conscripted Attorneys' Services

The justifications for not compensating attorneys that are assigned to represent indigent defendants in California, absent statutory authorization, are derived from common law and from California Business and Professions Code section 6068(h).'3 English
barristers have always been required to represent indigents without
indemnification upon court assignment, and the tradition has become
an American lawyer's obligation as well. 3 8 Although there exists
some skepticism over whether English barristers actually were obligated to provide free legal service whenever it was demanded of
them," 9 American courts have used this supposed British tradition to
justify not compensating court-appointed attorneys.' 40
135. See, e.g., State ex rel. Graves v. Daugherty, 164 W. Va. 726, 266 S.E. 2d 142
(1980); Reynolds v. Kimmans, Alaska, 569 P.2d 799 (1977); Artibee v. Cheboygan Circuit
Judge, 397 Mich. 54, 243 N.W. 2d 248 (1976).
136. Annot., 80 A.L.R. 3d 1141 (1977).
137. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (West 1968 & Supp. 1987). See supra note
51.
138. United States v. Dillon, 346 F.2d 633, 636 (9th Cir. 1965), cert. denied, 382 U.S.
978 (1966); Rowe v. Yuba County, 17 Cal. 61, 63 (1860); Uelmen, Simmering on the
"Backburner": the Challenge of Yarbrough, 19 Loy. L.A.L. REV. 285, 300-01 (1985) [hereinafter Uelmen].
139. Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 344, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 859; Shapiro, The
Enigma of the Lawyer's Duty to Serve, 55 N.Y.U.L. REV. 735 (1980).
140.

[T~he vast majority of courts, which have passed on the question, have de-
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California courts that have ruled on this issue also apply California Business and Professions Code section 6068(h), which provides that a lawyer should not reject "the cause of the defenseless or
the oppressed"14 as part of the rationale for not giving compensation142 The use of this section to justify this proposition was
maligned on the basis that it is a codification of an Oath of Admission to the Bar and is meant to describe the lawyer's obligation to
represent the unpopular client.' 4 Cunningham was the first case to
question whether the English tradition is factual and whether the
quoted part of section 6068(h) dictates that attorneys must accept
44
court appointments without receiving payment.
Although the inability of California attorneys to refuse a case
results from the California Business and Professions Code section
6068(h), it is the lack of statutory authorization to give funds to
court-appointed attorneys that keeps California courts from giving
them compensation for their services. 4 The Cunningham court recognized its lack of authority to order the expenditure of public funds
when the Legislature has not sanctioned such."" The combination of
common law precedents, judicial interpretation of California Business and Professions Code section 6068(h) and the lack of legislative
action impede the court-appointed counsel's ability to receive payment for his or her services in California.
Since the Cunningham court could not authorize money for the
conscripted attorney, the court believed it was obligated to block the
appointment of Cunningham. The court achieved this result by finding the county appointment plan in general and the conscription of
Cunningham specifically in violation of Cunningham's constitutional
rights. The court found that he was denied equal protection of the
nied claims of appointed counsel for non-statutory just compensation, pointing
out that representation of indigents under court order without a fee is a traditional obligation of the bar and therefore a condition under which lawyers are
licensed to practice as officers of the court.
Dillon, 346 F.2d at 637 (citations omitted).
141. Payne, 17 Cal. 3d at 920 n.6, 553 P.2d at 574 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.6
(quoting CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6068(h) (West 1968 & Supp. 1987)).
142. Payne, 17 Cal. 3d at 920 n.6, 553 P.2d at 574 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.6;
County of Tulare v. Ybarra, 143 Cal. App. 3d 580, 585-86, 192 Cal. Rptr. 49, 52-53 (1983);
County of Fresno, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 194, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 881.
143. Uelmen, supra note 138, at 300.
144. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 343, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 858.
145. Payne, 17 Cal. 3d at 920 n.6, 553 P.2d at 574 n.6, 132 Cal. Rptr. at 414 n.6;
County of Fresno, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 194, 146 Cal. Rptr. at 881; County of Tulare, 143 Cal.
App. 3d at 585-86, 192 Cal. Rptr. at 52-53.
146. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 356, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
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law. " " The court declined to strictly scrutinize the Ventura County
court-appointed counsel plan.14 8 Instead, the court reviewed whether
the conscription of attorneys to represent indigent defendants bore a
rational relationship to the legitimate state purpose of assisting the
poor. " 9 Without explicitly answering this question, the Cunningham court stated that this purpose "cannot be accomplished at the
expense of one particular group of people."1 '
Recognizing that "a reasonable burden as a condition of licensing does not offend constitutional principles," ' the court determined that requiring "lawyers to devote a reasonable amount of time
to represent indigent defendants in paternity cases as a condition of
licensing, might not offend constitutional principles if all lawyers
were to bear the burden evenly." ' 2 Yet, the court believed that this
potential requirement might leave indigent defendants with attorneys
who are inexperienced in paternity proceedings, if not litigation in
general. "' However, if only trial lawyers are selected to represent
these indigents, these appointments would violate these attorneys'
constitutional rights.1 "" The Cunningham court concluded, "[i]t
therefore appears that insuperable obstacles stand in the way of any
attempt to allocate pro bono work in paternity cases so as not to
offend equal protection principles." '5 5
The Cunningham decision stands alone in refusing to allow a
court to appoint an attorney to represent an indigent without compensation because of an equal protection violation. Other jurisdictions, however, disallow this conscription on different constitutional
grounds. The latter courts hold that forcing an attorney to represent
an indigent civil litigant without compensation was a taking of the
attorney's property without due process of law. 56 Other courts al147. Id. at 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 854.
148. Id. at 348, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 861. "The right to pursue one's chosen profession is
not a fundamental right for the purpose of invoking the strict scrutiny test." (citations omitted)
Id.
149. Id. at 348, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 861.
150. Id.
151. Id. at 349, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 862. The court noted taking exams, paying dues and
completing courses would be a reasonable burden. Id.
152. Id. at 349, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 862.
153. Id.
154. Id. at 350, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
155. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 350, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
156. See, e.g., State ex rel. Scott v. Roper, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. banc. 1985); Weiner v.
Fulton County, 113 Ga. App. 343, 148 S.E. 2d 143 (1966); Knox County Council v. State ex
rel. McCormick, 217 Ind. 493, 29 N.E. 2d 405 (1940); Bedford v. Salt Lake County, 22 Utah
2d 12, 447 P.2d 193 (1968). See generally County of Fresno, 82 Cal. App. 3d at 205-06, 146
Cal. Rptr. at 889-90.
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lowed the appointment of attorneys without compensation but decided that the attorney's payment of litigation costs and expenses was
a taking of the counsel's property without due process of law.""7 It is
difficult to assess whether the isolation of the Cunningham holding
diminishes its impact, but the Cunningham court, along with at least
one other non-California court that decided against the conscription
of attorneys, 58 displayed other reasons for striking down the Ventura County conscription plan.
Before the Cunningham court discussed whether Cunningham's
appointment violated his constitutional rights, the court traced the
history of an attorney's special position in American society. The
court noted that this privileged status no longer exists, if it ever did
at all. ' 9 Within the equal protection violation analysis, the Cunningham court discussed the difficulties involved in attempting to
formulate a representation plan that would not violate the appointed
attorney's constitutional rights while still providing the indigent defendant with adequate representation."' In that discussion, the court
was concerned with the conscription of attorneys who have no family
law and/or litigation experience."' Also, the court worried that a
conscripted attorney may not be able or willing to provide the time,
effort and conscientiousness that he or she would normally give if the
case had been voluntarily taken by him or her.' 62 Since the foundation of the Cunningham decision rests upon the equal protection
analysis, it is difficult to estimate how much weight these policy factors influenced the ruling. Still, they have their logical appeal and
were considered by the Cunningham court in making its decision.
The effect of the Cunningham decision could be substantial. As
a result of this case, Ventura County cannot prosecute a paternity
proceeding unless a volunteer represents the indigent defendant or
unless the county or state provides reasonable compensation for an
appointed counsel. 6 Even though this decision is contrary to the
holding in County of Tulare,164 the violation of the attorney's consti157. See, e.g., Williamson v. Vardeman, 674 F.2d 1211 (8th Cir. 1982); State v. Robinson, 123 N.H. 665, 465 A.2d 1214 (1983). See generally Uelmen, supra note 138, at 312-17.
158. Scott, 688 S.W.2d 757 (Mo. banc. 1985).
159. Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 345-47, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 859-61.
160. 177 Cal. App. 3d at 349-51, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 862-63.
161. Id.
162. Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 354-55, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 866.
163. Id. at 356, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
164. 143 Cal. App. 3d 580, 192 Cal. Rptr. 49 (1983). The court of appeals disallowed
the trial court from dismissing a paternity cause of action because of no public funds to pay the
appointed attorney.
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tutional rights combined with section 128 of the Code of Civil Procedure1" gave the trial court the power to dismiss the action. 66 The
Cunningham court presumes that state agencies will continue to enforce these actions against non-indigent defendants." 7 But what of
the proceedings with indigent defendants? Will the state turn around
and decide that the mothers receiving state child support cannot receive the funds since the state agencies cannot prosecute these actions? ' The possible ramifications of Cunningham could have adverse effects upon the state, the county and welfare recipients.
In order to avoid these potentially negative consequences, the
California Legislature should act. Both the Cunningham and Yarbrough courts requested legislative action.' 6 9 The Legislature passed
Senate Bill 2057 in 1984,"'0 which appropriated $1,000,000 for compensation and reimbursement of attorneys "involuntarily appointed"
to provide representation in civil actions "whenever an indigent
party . . . has the constitutional right to be represented by coun-

sel."'' Governor Deukmejian vetoed the bill. 1 72 He hoped that Yarbrough,73 which was pending before the California Supreme Court
at the time of the veto, would resolve the issue.

4

Governor

Deukmejian stated:
In any event, I do not support this measure since it, in effect,
creates an open ended appropriation which will be subject to
substantial expansion by the court. This bill provides that as a
matter of statutory right an indigent party has the right to representation by State paid counsel whenever a constitutional
right is in question. This allows the California Supreme Court
to control the expenditure of funds for representation of indigents. Additionally, I note that the decisional law thus far has
been confined to indigents who are incarcerated in prison. This
measure, however, could potentially be expanded by the court
broadening the term 'constitutional right' to apply to any indi165. CAL. CIV. PROC. CODE § 128 (West 1982 & Supp. 1987). In pertinent part this
section grants the trial court the power to dismiss a suit if it must in order to make its orders
conformable to law and justice.
166. Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 356, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
167. Id. at 357, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867.
168. See supra note 117.
169. Cunningham, 177 Cal. App. 3d at 356-57, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 867; Yarbrough, 39
Cal. 3d at 207, 702 P.2d at 589, 216 Cal. Rptr. at 431.
170. Cal. S.B. 2057, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. 1 (1984). See supra text accompanying note 77.
171. Cal. S.B. 2057, 1983-84 Reg. Sess. 1(1984).
172. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 79, at 14,346.
173. 39 Cal. 3d 197, 216 Cal. Rptr. 425 (1985).
174. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 79, at 14,346.
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gent defendant.
I, however, sympathize with the members of the Bar who
find themselves mandatorily required to represent indigent defendants; I believe this approach is unhealthy for the legal profession and the defendants who are faced with being represented
by reluctant counsel.1"'
Although this position ignores the extent to which indigents
were judicially recognized as being entitled to representation, the
veto also indicates Deukmejian's displeasure with the open-ended
language of the bill. A law more narrowly drawn might avoid such a
veto and become enacted into law, especially since the Governor expressed sympathy for the problem. Judicial inability to require funding for these indigent defendants has been noted. Counties could provide compensation to these attorneys, but local funding of public
defender offices has created problems for some small counties which
cannot even afford to pay for some expensive defenses.17 Thus, the
logical solution is for the Legislature to try again by passing another
statute that takes into account the governor's concerns.
IV.

PROPOSAL

Governor Deukmejian's veto of Senate Bill 2057177 should not
discourage the Legislature from providing compensation to court-appointed counsel for indigent civil defendants. The Governor expressed his sympathy with the plight of these conscripted attorneys,
and his criticisms of the bill centered on the potential for substantial
expansion by the Supreme Court of the right of an indigent civil
litigant to retain pro bono representation. 178 As described in the
analysis, California courts recognize five civil suits where an indigent
defendant has the right to an appointed attorney.1 79 A bill that specifically lists the civil suits in which indigent defendants may be assigned counsel might be more appealing to the Governor. If
Deukmejian's silence in his veto1 80 regarding -the compensatory aspects of Senate Bill 2057 are construed as a tacit approval of that
language in the bill, the new bill need only differ from the old bill in
its entitlement phraseology.
175.

176.
Rptr. 165
177.
178.
179.

Id. at 14,347.

See, e.g., Corenevsky v. Superior Court, 36 Cal. 3d 307, 682 P.2d 360, 204 Cal.
(1984). See generally Uelmen, supra note 138, at 319-22.
SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 79, at 14,346.
Id.
See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
180. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 79, at 14,346.
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The California Legislature would not have to guess which proceedings would entail a right to counsel. The California courts have
decided in which civil cases indigent defendants should be appointed
attorneys. 8 ' Not only will prior judicial decisions indicate which
causes of action indigents should be given the right to counsel, the
Legislature should review two New York statutes which precisely
list the proceedings in which indigents are entitled to assigned counsel.' 82 These statutes do not give these appointed attorneys compensation, but their description of the applicable causes of action would
be helpful as guidance for the formation of the right to counsel section of the new bill. By looking to other states for guidance, the California Legislature will not be creating an unprecedented law.' 8 3
The goals of the Legislature are twofold: First, identify the civil
proceeding in which indigent defendants have the right to court-appointed counsel, and second, provide reasonable compensation to
court-appointed attorneys for their fees and litigation costs. The Legislature cannot wait for the courts to order compensation for these
conscripted attorneys; the delay will not change the situation. 4 Procrastination in the hope of a reversal of the holding in Cunningham ' 5 is probably a vain aspiration. The Legislature should act to
meet these goals. The following proposed legislation achieves the desired objectives.
The following is an act which adds section 1021.8 to the Code
of Civil Procedure,' making an appropriation therefore.
LEGISLATIVE COUNSEL'S DIGEST

S.B.

#

Civil Actions: Attorney fees.

Existing law does not provide for reimbursement of attorney
fees and litigation expenses and costs borne by an attorney appointed
to represent an indigent defendant in a civil action. Existing law specifically authorizes a court to appoint an attorney to represent an
181. See supra notes 104-08 and accompanying text.
182. 29(A) N.Y. FAM. CT. Acr §§ 261-262 (McKinney 1983). Subsection b of section
262 provides representation to any adult if a judge believes an attorney appointment is mandated by the Constitution of the State of New York or of the United States.
183. Not only has the representation issue been handled by New York, many states have
adopted the Uniform Parentage Act, which gives certain indigents court-appointed attorneys.
184. See supra notes 145-46 and accompanying text.
185. 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986).
186. Code of Civil Procedure sections 1021 through 1021.9 relate to the awarding of
attorney's fees in various litigation. CAL. CIV. PROC. §§ 1021-1021.9 (West 1982 & Supp.
1987).
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indigent in a civil action, without compensation, upon the withdrawal of a legal service agency representing the indigent, as
specified.
This bill would require a court to award reasonable compensation, as specified, for legal services provided and litigation expenses
and costs incurred, whenever an indigent defendant in a civil action,
as specified, is entitled to representation by counsel, and an attorney
is involuntarily appointed by the court to provide that representation.
The bill would limit the rate of compensation for appointed counsel
to a maximum of $60 per hour. The bill would state that, unless
otherwise provided by law, a court award for compensation shall be
paid by the state.
This bill would appropriate $1,000,000 to the Controller to
make payments in accordance with the bill, 3% of which amount
may be allocated by the Controller for administrative costs.
The people of the State of California do enact as follows:
SECTION 1. Section 1021.8 is added to the Code of Civil Procedure, to read:
1021.8 (a) Any indigent defendant in the following civil actions
has the right to be represented by counsel.
(1) A prisoner in any civil action if the trial court ascertains
that a continuance is not feasible, the prisoner's interests are actually
would be helpful to him under
at stake in the suit, and an attorney
87
1
the circumstances of the case.

(2) Any man in a paternity suit where the state appears as a
party or appears on behalf of a mother or a child.188
(3) Any person in a suit brought by the state pursuant to Civil
Code section 232 or Welfare and Institutions Code section 600(a),
where the state is attempting to take custody of the person's child or
children."'
(4) Any person in a suit brought by the stepparent to adopt and
take custody of the person's child or children, pursuant to Civil Code
section 224.19

(5) Any person in a suit brought by the state pursuant to Welfare and Institutions Code section 11350, where the state attempts to
obtain reimbursement for money given to the person's child or chil187. Payne, 17 Cal. 3d 908, 553 P.2d 565, 132 Cal. Rptr. 405 (1976).
188. Salas, 24 Cal. 3d 22, 593 P.2d 226, 154 Cal. Rptr. 529 (1979).
189. Rodriguez, 34 Cal. App. 3d 510, 110 Cal. Rptr. 56 (1973); Simeth, 40 Cal. App.
3d 982, 115 Cal. Rptr. 617 (1974).
190. Jay R., 150 Cal. App. 3d 251, 197 Cal. Rptr. 672 (1983).
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dren for their support.191
(6) Any person in an appeal of any suit identified in (1)
through (5) above. 92
(b) Whenever an indigent is a defendant in a civil action set
forth in subdivision (a), and an attorney has been involuntarily appointed by the court to provide that representation, the court shall
award the attorney reasonable compensation for the legal services
provided and reasonably necessary litigation expenses and costs incurred. In no event shall the award exceed the rate of reimbursement
for appointed counsel in comparable cases in the community. There
shall be a presumption that the lowest rate in the cotinty is the reasonable rate unless the judge states on the record, after consideration
of the factors set forth in subdivision (d), that another rate for appointed counsel is more appropriate. In no event shall the rate exceed sixty dollars ($60) per hour.
(c) Unless otherwise provided by law, the award shall be paid
by the Controller from funds appropriated for that purpose, upon
submission to the Controller of a Controller's claim form, containing
a certification by the clerk that the claim is in accordance with the
court order for payment. Upon a showing of good cause, an order
granting payment for these services and costs shall be made on a
periodic or interim basis during the pendency of any such civil
action.
(d) In determining the reasonableness of the compensation, the
court shall consider the following factors, no one of which shall be
controlling.
(1) The customary fee in the community for similar services
rendered by privately retained counsel to a non-indigent client.
(2) The time and labor required to be spent by the attorney.
(3) The difficulty of the representation.
(4) The novelty or uncertainty of the law upon which the decision depended.
(5) The degree of professional ability, skill, and experience
called for and exercised in the performance of the services.
(6) The professional character, qualification, and standing of
the attorney.
Section 2. The sum of one million dollars ($1,000,000.00)'. is
191. County of Ventura, 133 Cal. App. 3d 105, 183 Cal. Rptr. 741 (1982).
192. Jacqueline H., 21 Cal. 3d 170, 577 P.2d 683, 145 Cal. Rptr. 548 (1978).
193. This was the original sum appropriated by Senate Bill 2057. Cal. S.B. 2057, 198384 Reg. Sess. 1 (1984). Even though this amount may be too small, the primary concern at
this point should be to get this bill past the governor and the fiscal conservatives in the Legisla-
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hereby appropriated from the General Fund to the Controller to
make payments in accordance with this act. Three percent of this
appropriation and of any subsequent appropriations made for the
same purpose may be retained and used by the Comptroller to administer the provisions of this act.
The proposed legislation accomplishes both goals that must be
achieved in the law's drafting. The proposed law appoints counsel to
indigent civil defendants in five specific civil causes of action and any
appeals of decisions in these five suits. The legislation also gives
compensation to court-appointed attorneys in these five suits.
Section (1)(a) of the proposed law addresses the Governor's
fears that the judiciary will expand the right to counsel to any civil
proceeding."' The detailed description of which civil suits are to
have the right to a court-appointed attorney not only alleviates any
of Governor Deukmejian's qualms, but section (1)(a), more importantly, is a statutory recognition of an indigent's right to counsel in
these particular civil suits. Even though courts already assign attorneys in these civil proceedings without statutory authorization, this
law's specific guidance ensures that indigents receive proper representation in the proceedings listed in section (1)(a).
Section (1)(b) answers the call for legislative action that Califor1 95
nia courts have been requesting for two years. The compensation
given by this section should meet the requirements of Cunningham.1"O If there have been dismissals or continuances of any pater197 section
nity proceeding because of the Cunningham decision,
(1)(b) allows courts to appoint counsel in the civil causes of action
detailed in section (l)(a) without violating these attorneys' constitutional rights.198 Because this law considers community standards,
there is flexibility in the attorneys' fees. This flexibility demonstrates
the legislation's balance between reasonable compensation and reimbursement for fees, costs and expenses and the need for fiscal
accountability.
The presumption set forth in section (1)(b) that the lowest rate
in the county is the reasonable rate appears to discourage representation of indigents in the suits listed in section (1)(a). Yet, a judge
could decide to increase any attorney's compensation by considering
ture. Hopefully, the amount will be increased if more money is needed to be paid to attorneys.
194. SENATE JOURNAL, supra note 79, at 14,346 (1984).
195. See supra note 171 and accompanying text.
196. 177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986).
197. See supra notes 171-75 and accompanying text.
198. See supra notes 147-49 and accompanying text.
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the factors listed in section (l)(d). The judge's ability to determine
what the appropriate compensation and/or reimbursement for appointed counsel not only ensures a fair indemnification, but also alleviates attorneys' fears that they will not be paid a fair fee for involved and complex litigation.
Although this bill accomplishes the goals established in the paragraph before the proposed legislation, this bill is not a panacea for
all potential problems in this field. This bill does not establish a
workable plan as to how these attorneys will be appointed. The
Cunningham court expressed concern that any selection process
adopted by a county might violate these appointed attorneys' constitutional rights.1 9' Yet, after expressing these concerns, the court concluded that the lack of state-appropriated funds is the "root of the
problem." 20 This bill solves the Cunningham court's equal protection concerns. Attorneys are no longer appointed to indigent defendants without compensation.
Another potential problem that this bill does not address is ensuring that these indigent defendants will receive qualified representation. The proposed law does not give any guidelines for appointing
attorneys that are experienced in the suits listed in section (l)(a).
The Cunningham court expressed concern that these indigent defendants might receive inadequate counsel."' This bill does not
render related decisions immune from ineffective assistance attacks,
and these appointed attorneys are still liable for any malpractice
claims. One can only guess if judges who appoint counsel pursuant
to this bill will find willing and qualified counsel.
Although this proposed legislation does not remedy all possible
problems of court-appointed attorneys for indigent civil defendants,
the bill satisfies the requirements of Cunningham2 " and gives reasonable compensation to conscripted attorneys. If trial courts are unable to try cases listed in section (l)(a) of this bill due to the Cunningham decision, the proposed legislation gives indigent defendants
in these suits the representation that the Constitution guarantees,
and, further, it will give these court-appointed attorneys the compensation that the Constitution mandates.
199.
200.
201.
202.

177 Cal. App. 3d at 350-51, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
Id. at 351, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 863.
Id. at 353-56, 222 Cal. Rptr. at 865-67.
177 Cal. App. 3d 336, 222 Cal. Rptr. 854 (1986).
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CONCLUSION

The expansion of indigent defendants' right to counsel has created a corresponding problem regarding the compensation for their
court-appointed attorneys. Without any statutory authorization for
payment, conscripted counsel have had to represent defendants without receiving reimbursement for their services. Departing from a
well-established judicial precedent, the Cunningham"'3 court decision disallowed a pro bono appointment due to a violation of the
conscripted counsel's constitutional rights. If the other districts adopt
the Cunningham approach, no attorneys can be assigned to indigent
civil defendants unless they receive some indemnification for their
work. The judiciary's inability to appropriate funds for compensation for these attorneys has made it incumbent on the California
Legislature to give money to conscripted counsel.
The statutory reform proposed in this comment recognizes the
right of indigent defendants to receive assigned counsel in certain
civil proceedings. In addition, the proposed bill compensates appointed attorneys for their services and gives reasonable indemnification to these lawyers. The constitutional problems with appointing
attorneys in appropriate civil suits are eliminated, and the indigent
defendants will receive better representation. The Legislature must
take action in order to resolve the constitutional conflict between the
need to appoint counsel for indigent civil defendants and the necessity that appointed attorneys receive reasonable compensation.
Charles S. Redfield

203. Id.

